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Abstract1
This paper studies liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how pro-
perty rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We ﬁnd
that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses resulting from
such instances are small. This, however, does not result from reliance on legal institutions
-- actual recourse to police and courts is fairly rare, except in cases of theft -- but from
traders’ reluctance to expose themselves to opportunism. As a result, Malagasy grain
trade resembles a ﬂea market, with little or no forward contracting and high transactions
costs. The dominant contract enforcement mechanism is trust-based relationships. Trust
is established primarily through repeated interaction with little role for referral by other
traders. Information on bad clients does not circulate widely, hence severely limiting
group punishments for non payment.
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Europe, the fundamental role that market institutions play in economic growth has
become increasingly recognized. In particular, North argued that individual property
rights need to be protected from theft and embezzlement as well as from arbitrary
expropriation by agents of the state. In addition, institutions such as lawyers and courts
must exist that ensure compliance with contractual obligations and deter opportunistic
breach of contract. These ideas have largely shaped the research and policy agenda for
transition economies and developing countries alike (e.g., Benson (1990), Baer and Gray
(1995), Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman (1998), McMillan (1996), Fafchamps (1996)).
They have also spawn new and insightful research in the various forms that market insti-
tutions have taken over the course of human history (e.g., Ensminger (1992), Greif (1993,
1994), Milgrom, North and Weingast (1991)).
This paper studies whether institutions exist in present day Madagascar that protect
property rights and ensure contract compliance among grain traders. Madagascar is a
particularly suitable place to study market institutions at early stages of development
because, until recently, grain trade was entirely under state control (e.g., Barrett (1997a,
1997b), Dorosh and Bernier (1994), Berg (1989)). At the same time, the island has kept
much of the French legal code and judicial system that it inherited from colonisation.
Malagasy commercial law may be a little dated, not having been overhauled since
independence (e.g., Root (1993)). But it is likely to be quite superior to the legal environ-
ment that prevails in most transitional economies. Liberalized grain trade in Madagascar
thus constitutes an interesting test case of the role of law per se in the development of
efﬁcient markets and it provides a unique window on the early development of markets
when laws are adequate. An analysis of the functioning of Madagascar grain markets2 
should therefore supply useful insights on the likely effect of legal reform in transition
economies at a similar level of development.
Using data from a trader survey that we designed and collected ourselves, we show
that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low among Malagasy grain traders
and that the losses resulting from such instances are small. At prima facie these results
suggest that market institutions work well. A closer look at the evidence, however,
reveals that low incidence of theft and contractual breach is achieved essentially through
low exposure. Theft is rare because many traders do not stock the goods they sell and, if
they do, they go to great length ensuring that their stocks are protected -- e.g., by sleeping
in their store. Econometric analysis conﬁrms that overnight storage is a signiﬁcant risk
factor in theft incidence. Among those to transport grain from town to town, payment of
protection money and travel in convoy are common -- presumably against the risk of
highway robbery that is endemic in certain parts of the country. Surveyed traders even
declare refraining from hiring additional workers for fear of employee-related theft.
The situation regarding contract compliance is similar. Malagasy traders limit their
exposure to potential breach of contract by adopting commercial practices that leave lit-
tle room for abuse. Most transactions take a simple cash-and-carry form. Supplier credit
is infrequent, and the placement of orders is uncommon. Payment by check and invoicing
are virtually unheard of. Traders personally inspect the quality of goods purchased in
nearly all transactions. Econometric analysis indicates that exposure is the dominant risk
factor in all cases of contractual breach.
Survey results further show that recourse to legal institutions is rare, but that it
increases with the severity of the dispute. The use of police and courts is indeed highest3 
in theft cases and lowest in late delivery and deﬁcient quality cases, with non-payment
by clients in between. Direct negotiation with the other party is the dominant conﬂict
resolution method in contractual disputes. Traders’ propensity to solve disputes and to
resume trade with each other is shown to depend critically on the use of direct negotia-
tions with the other party. Recourse to negotiations in turn depends on the strength of the
relationship between trading partners. These results are broadly similar to those reported
by Bigsten et al. (1998) for African manufacturing. They conﬁrm Fafchamps and
Minten’s (1998a) earlier conclusion that relationships play an important role in the reso-
lution of contractual disputes among Malagasy traders.
Finding that legal institutions do not play an important role in the enforcement of
contracts begs the question of which alternative mechanism is used by Malagasy traders.
Our analysis suggest that trust-based relationships are the dominant contract enforcement
mechanism among grain traders. Trust is established primarily through repeated interac-
tion with little role for referral by other traders. Information on bad clients does not cir-
culate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non payment. The lack of
information sharing does not result from the existence of linguistic, ethnic, or religious
obstacles to communication. Rather, it may be due to the disruption of pre-existing Asian
networks following food riots in the late 1980’s (e.g., Blanchy (1995)). Why native net-
works did not emerge in their stead remains a mystery, however.
To summarize, grain trade in Madagascar ressembles a ﬂea market more than the
sophisticated business world that proponents of market liberalization typically envision.
Although the direct costs of theft and contractual breach appear low, the methods that
surveyed traders use to minimize risk exposure can but add to transactions costs. The
need for traders to personally inspect quality on each delivery, for instance, combined4 
with their unwillingness to delegate quality control to subordinates and with their reluc-
tance to hire additional workers for fear of theft, undoubtedly restrict ﬁrm size and ﬁrm
growth. The need to guard stocks in person, the total absence of payment by check (that
adds to the risk of theft), the infrequent use of trade credit, and the difﬁculty of placing
orders complicate the conduct of business and make trade very labor and management
intensive.
The transactions costs of trade are ultimately paid by producers and consumers in
the form of a larger spread between farm-gate and retail price (e.g., IFPRI (1998)). The
welfare cost of ﬂea markets is thus not negligible. In addition, judging from the extreme
dispersion in ﬁrm size (Gini coefﬁcient of total sales around 0.75) and the fact that better
connected traders economize on transactions costs and reap higher sales and proﬁts (e.g.,
Fafchamps and Minten (1998a)), it is far from clear that competition yields efﬁciency.
Indeed, Fafchamps and Minten’s (1998b) ﬁnding that traders with better social network
capital make more proﬁts suggest that they do not take advantage of their lower costs to
drive out small, unconnected traders. In other words, in a ﬂea market economy, the coex-
istence of a large number of atomistic ﬁrms with a small number of large, well connected
traders should not be taken as an indication that competitive forces are sufﬁcient to elim-
inate rents (see Barrett (1997b) for a similar observation). This is because, among other
things, small traders’ efforts to protect their property rights and avoid being cheated leads
to high transactions costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 1 with a brief
description of the surveys. Section 2 follows with an analysis of the incidence of theft
and breach of contract. Regression analysis is presented that tries to identify their deter-
minants. Deterrence and contract enforcement mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.5 
Conclusions are presented at the end.
Section 1. The Data
A survey of agricultural traders was conducted in Madagascar in a joint project
between IFPRI (the International Food Policy Research Institute) and the local Ministry
of Scientiﬁc Research (FOFIFA). The ﬁrst round of the survey was held between May
1997 and August 1997 and collected information on the individual characteristics of
traders and on the structure, conduct, and performance of the trading sector. A second
survey round was conducted between September 1997 and November 1997; it focused on
the nature of respondents’ relationships with other traders, clients, and suppliers.
The sample design was constructed so as to be as representative as possible of all
the traders involved in the whole food marketing chain from producer to consumer,
wherever located. Three main agricultural regions were covered (Fianarantsoa, Majunga,
and Antananarivo) and the sampling frame within these regions was set up so as to cover
traders operating at three different levels:
(1) Traders operating in big and small urban markets in the main town of every pro-
vince (faritany) and district (ﬁvondronana). These traders are mostly wholesalers,
semi-wholesalers, and retailers.
(2) Urban traders located outside the regular markets. These often are bigger traders,
processors (e.g., rice millers), and wholesalers.
(3) Traders operating on rural markets at the level of the rural county (ﬁraisana). These
are mostly big and small assemblers and itinerant traders. Rural ﬁraisanas were
selected through stratiﬁed sampling based on agro-ecological characteristics so as to
be representative of the various kind of marketed products and marketing seasons.6 
The survey focused on traders that marketed locally consumed staples such as rice,
cassava, potatoes, beans, and peanuts. The different forms in which these products are
marketed were taken into consideration, i.e., paddy and milled rice, maize and maize
ﬂour, etc. Traders involved primarily in export crops, fruits, vegetables, and minor crops
were excluded. Most surveyed traders -- 67% -- report rice as the agricultural product
they trade most intensively. This reﬂects the importance of rice as the main staple food in
the country. Other most actively traded products are beans and lentils (18% of the sample
report them as their main traded product), cassava (5%), potatoes (5%), peanuts (4%),
and maize (2%).
A total number of 850 traders were surveyed in the ﬁrst round, 739 of whom were
surveyed again in the second round. The analysis presented here is based on traders that
could be located in the two rounds.2 The main characteristics of respondents are summar-
ized in Table 1. Total sales measures output. Value added, deﬁned as the difference
between the value of total sales and total purchases, represents total returns to labor,
management, and capital. As suggested by the presence of large standard deviations,
these averages hide extreme variation in traders’ size of operation: the coefﬁcients of
variation of sales and value added are 2.6 and 3.7, respectively. The corresponding Gini
coefﬁcients are 0.761 and 0.702. Expressed in percentage of annual sales, the average
trade margin is 15%. Assuming that grain changes hands four times between producer
and ﬁnal consumer, such margins translate into a consumer price on average 75% higher
than the farm-gate price (e.g., IFPRI (1998)). Margins of this magnitude are common in
_ ______________
2 The category of traders which were hardest to trace during the second survey round are those who are
least formal and have the least permanent form of operation. As a result, small itinerant traders tend to be
underrepresented in the results reported here.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Detailed information is available on working capital and equipment (mostly weight-
ing equipment), storage capacity and vehicles, telephone usage, labor, management,
human capital, and social capital. The data show that the surveyed businesses are fairly
unsophisticated by western standards: average working capital is roughly equivalent to
2,000 US dollars -- a large number compared to the annual GDP of Madagascar which
was 230 US dollars in 1997, but very small compared to the turnover of grain trading
companies in the U.S. or Europe. The great majority of surveyed traders do not have their
own transportation equipment, nor do they use telephones very often. Each trading busi-
ness has an average of four workers, including the owner/manager. Most respondents
work full time in trade and remain traders all year round. On average, they are fairly well
educated by Madagascar standards. In Madagascar trade is conducted in Malagasy, the
national language which is spoken throughout the island. French is commonly used in the
administration and in some (primarily urban) secondary schools. Close to half of the
respondents commonly speak a language other than Malagasy -- mostly French. Informa-
tion was also collected on various dimensions of the respondents’ social network: the
number of close relatives in agricultural trade; the number of (non-family) traders that
respondents know; the number of friends and family members who can help the business
stay aﬂoat in times of trouble; and the number of suppliers and clients that respondents
know personally. Fafchamps and Minten (1998b) examine how these different forms
social network capital affect ﬁrm performance.
Data are also available on the way traders deal with each other. On average, sur-
veyed traders buy and sell mostly in cash. Invoicing and the use of checks are virtually
unheard of. A small but non-negligible proportion of traders nevertheless manage to8 
receive and grant trade credit -- 15.8% and 13.6% of total grain purchases and sales,
respectively -- typically for one week. Since respondents rotate their working capital
several times per month, even short term credit can signiﬁcantly add to their buying
capacity. Surveyed traders do part of their business with regular suppliers and clients,
with whom they are more likely to place orders and receive or grant credit and less likely
to inspect quality. This conforms with theoretical expectations according to which rela-
tionships facilitate contract enforcement (e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996), Kranton (1996),
Fafchamps (1998a)).
Section 2. Incidence of Theft and Breach of Contract
Table 2 summarizes the incidence of theft and breach of contract in the twelve
months preceding the survey. Only a small proportion of traders were victim of theft and
the total value of stolen goods accounted for less that 0.3% of total annual sales.
Incidence appeared much higher for a handful of respondents, but we cannot rule out the
possibility of error in data collection. Of 57 instances of recent thefts, 24 took place at
the trader’s store during the day, 24 took place at night, 7 during transport, and 3 while
the goods were in the hands of third parties (Table 3). Not all thefts are equally costly,
however: the average value of stolen goods is on average nine times higher for thefts at
night or during transport. In a third of theft cases, respondents were conﬁdent that
employees were not responsible; in the rest of the cases, respondents either suspected
employees or were unsure. Not surprisingly, traders who suspect employees are those
with more employees -- 7.7 vs. 3.4 among those respondents who do not suspect their
workforce. Pilferage by employees is thus is a concern of surveyed traders, especially
large ones.9 
Breaches of contract are somewhat more prevalent, but they too affect only a minor-
ity of survey respondents (Table 2). The proportions of sales and purchases affected by
breach of contract are all less than 5% on average, although they are much higher for
some traders. Deﬁcient quality and late payment are the most often cited problems,
affecting a ﬁfth and a third of traders, respectively. But their implied cost is only a frac-
tion of the value of the transaction -- e.g., the loss in value due to inferior quality and the
opportunity cost of capital in case of late payment. The same is true for late delivery.
Non payment, a much more severe form of breach of contract, is quite rare and affects
only 0.04% of all transactions. These ﬁndings are similar to those reported by Fafchamps
(1996), Bigsten et al. (1998).
Judging from these numbers, the direct costs of theft and breach of contract are
quite small -- less than one percent of annual sales on average.3 Some traders occasion-
ally suffer more severe losses, however, especially when goods are stolen at night or dur-
ing transport. On the basis of these numbers, one may be tempted to conclude that the
rule of law prevails in Madagascar and that malfeasance is adequately deterred by exist-
ing legal institutions. A closer inspection of the evidence demonstrates, however, that
such a conclusion is unwarranted: the low incidence of malfeasance owes more to
prevention by traders than to legal deterrence. Surveyed traders indeed go to great
lengths to minimize the risk of theft and breach of contract. Table 3 lists some of the
measures surveyed traders take to minimize theft. Over a third of respondents declare
refraining from hiring additional workers for fear of employee theft. The magnitude of
_ ______________
3 Estimated from Table 2 assuming that losses from late delivery and late payment account for at most
10% of the value of sales and that losses from deﬁcient quality account for at most 5% of sales value. With
these generous assumptions, total losses amount to 0.89% of total sales -- 0.28% from theft, 0.04% from
non-payment, 0.16% from late delivery, 0.22% from deﬁcient quality, and 0.19% from late payment.
Recovered goods are not subtracted from loss from theft.10 
this ﬁgure -- and its likely welfare cost in an economy where underemployment is ram-
pant and trade is a major source of employment -- perfectly illustrates the idea that the
indirect costs of malfeasance are potentially much larger than its direct costs (see Hart
(1988) for a similar observation). Table 3 also shows that, among traders who stock agri-
cultural products at night, two third sleep on the premices. Virtually all overnight storage
is both locked and guarded. Of those traders who transport goods from one town to
another, 43% either pay for protection or travel in convoy.4 In addition, thirteen traders
-- all from the same province (Fianaranatsoa) -- declare avoiding certain routes for fear
of highway robbery.
A similar picture emerges for quality control. Table 4 indicates that prices vary with
product quality. For instance, the price differential between the two most traded rice
qualities oscilate between 8% and 9% in the capital city. Some of this quality variation is
due to differences in traditional crop varieties across regions.5 This source of quality
variation can presumably be controled by traders simply by verifying the geographical
origin of the goods they buy. Some of the variation in quality, however, does not come
from regional differences but from improper handling6 and from natural variation in trad-
itional seed material, thereby making it harder to ascertain. Taken together, the evidence
indicates that price varies with quality and that quality cannot be perfectly inferred by a
product’s region of origin. As table 4 shows, the overwhelming majority of surveyed
traders and their clients respond to quality risk by inspecting each and every purchase.
_ ______________
4 Interestingly, only two traders report doing both.
5 Unlike in advanced economies where most food is produced from a handful of highly homogeneous
improved seeds, farmers in Madagascar as well as in much of the tropics rely on their own output for
seeds. This process results in widespread dispersion in genetic traits and output characteristics across
regions and even villages.
6 E.g., high moisture content, fungus and pest damage, brokens, presence of stones and sand.11 
The importance of quality inspection is further underscored by the fact that the task is
virtually never delegated to family helpers, employees, or collecting agents. Although we
did not attempt to measure the time actually spent on quality veriﬁcation by Malagasy
traders, casual observation suggests that the process can be very time consuming. Furth-
ermore it requires that the trader be present at each purchase, thereby complicating the
conduct of business and requiring extensive travel on the part of the trader himself or
herself.
A similar pattern is observed with respect to other sources of breach of contract:
85% of surveyed traders never place orders from suppliers; and 54% never give credit to
customers. In addition, payment by check is unheard of; all transactions are strictly
cash.7 they complicate transactions and the planning of business.
However costly, these efforts are in general effective in minimizing the incidence of
malfeasance. As indicated by Table 5, simple t tests indicate that not storing overnight all
but eliminates the risk of theft. Not placing orders cancels the risk of late delivery, and
not giving credit to clients dramatically reduce the risks of late and non payment. The
results reported in Table 5 may, however, be unreliable because they ignore the effect of
other possible determinants of malfeasance, such as regional differences in incidence,
and the likely endogeneity of prevention.
We therefore complement the bivariate analysis reported in Table 5 with a mul-
tivariate regression analysis that controls for possible endogeneity. Results regarding
theft are presented in Table 6.8 The dependent variable is the value of annual losses due
_ ______________
7 The use of check is absent even of credit transactions, presumably because Malagasy banks are
notoriously slow in processing payments and transfers. At the time of the survey, it alledgedly took two to
three weeks for banks to transfer funds from agencies of the same bank located in two different towns.
8 To control for the possibility that results are driven by outliers (see large ’Maximum’ frequencies in
Table 2), all regressions on determinants of theft and breach of contract were reestimated after dropping all12 
to theft as a proportion of annual sales. The ﬁrst column examines the determinants of
theft incidence without conditioning on risky behavior. Explanatory variables include
total sales (to control for size), human capital (measured by years of schooling and the
log of years of trade experience), and location dummies. Presumably, larger ﬁrms may
experience more theft because they process a larger volume of goods and ﬁnd it harder to
control their employees. Total sales are instrumented to control for the possible feedback
effect that theft may have on sales.9 Human capital is included to control for the possibil-
ity that smarter, more experienced traders might be better able to prevent theft. Location
variables control for general crime environment and other spatial effects. Insecurity is
generally perceived to be highest in the Majunga plaines region and fairly high in the
Majunga plateaux region. We would therefore expect theft to be more problematic in
these regions. Results show that ﬁrms that sell more face more theft. Other variables are
not signiﬁcant.
We then introduce risk factors such as overnight storage and storage capacity as
additional regressors (second column of Table 6). As expected, results show that traders
who store overnight are more at risk. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient is very large.
Storage capacity has the expected sign but its t value is below standard levels of
signiﬁcance. As anticipated, the risk of theft is much larger in the two Majunga regions,
and largest in the region where insecurity is generally perceived to be highest. Experi-
mentation with other regressors suggests that transporting raises theft incidence and that
sleeping in one’s store reduces it, but the effects are no longer signiﬁcant once location
_ ______________
frequencies larger than 10%. Qualitative results are unchanged, but estimated parameter are in general
smaller in magnitude.
9 The instrumenting equation is presented in appendix A. Instruments include various measures of
physical and working capital, labor and management, social network capital, enterpreneurial traits and
family background, and aggregate shocks. See Fafchamps and Minten (1998b) for more details.13 
dummies are included in the regression.10 To control for possible endogeneity, we then
instrument risky behavior variables and replace them by their predicted value.11 Results
are presented in the third column of Table 6. They conﬁrm that risky behavior raises the
incidence of theft. The effect of regional dummies is unchanged.
We run similar regressions for various forms of breach of contract. To control for
network capital effects, we include as additional regressors the (log of the) number of
close relatives in agricultural trade and the number of suppliers and clients known per-
sonally by the respondent. Fafchamps and Minten (1998b) indeed demonstrate that better
connected traders not only make more proﬁts but also are more likely to place orders and
to give and receive trade credit. Following much of the literature (e.g., Fukuyama (1995),
Kranton (1996), Greif (1993), North (1990)), they hypothesize that social connections
mitigate opportunism. Regional dummies are included to capture possible differences in
road infrastructure, climate, and other location speciﬁc factors. Road quality is best in
and around the capital city, and in Majunga plaines; it is by far the worst in Majunga pla-
teaux and also fairly low in Fianaranatsoa. To the extent that late delivery is due to prob-
lems during transport, we would therefore expect late delivery to more prevalent in these
regions. Rainfall is most abundant in the Fianaranatsoa cotes et falaises region and in
Vakinantaratra; it is lowest in Majunga. Since deﬁcient quality is often related to imper-
fect drying, we would expect quality to be more problematic in humid regions.
Regression results are presented in Tables 7 to 10. Except for the veriﬁcation of
quality, which has the right sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant,12 the coefﬁcients of all
_ ______________
10 The fact that robust results are difﬁcult to obtain with more regressors is not altogether surprising
given that there are only 57 non-zero observations.
11 Instrumenting equations are presented in Appendix B. Instruments include personal wealth, age, and
sex of the owner, social network capital, personal traits, and family background.
12 Quality veriﬁcation is signiﬁcant when location dummies are omitted.14 
risk factors have the right sign and are signiﬁcant. Contrary to expectations, traders with
family members in agricultural trade appear to face a higher incidence of contractual
breach. For deﬁcient quality and for non-payment, the effect is signiﬁcant even after we
control for risky behavior. This suggests that having more relatives in trade favors con-
tractual opportunism, presumably because traders ﬁnd it difﬁcult to discipline relatives
who operate as suppliers or clients. This may explain why Fafchamps and Minten
(1998b) ﬁnd that respondents with more relatives in agricultural trade get signiﬁcantly
lower proﬁts after controling for all factors and inputs.
Results also indicate the presence of very strong regional differences in the
incidence of breach of contract, even after we control for urbanization level. Contrary to
expectations, however, we do not ﬁnd that regions with inferior road infrastructure have
more late delivery problems and that wetter regions have more deﬁcient quality cases. If
anything, Majunga plateaux, the region with by far the poorest road infrastructure, has
less late delivery cases than other regions, and the Fianaranatsoa cotes et falaises region,
which is the most humid, has fewer cases of deﬁcient quality. Results indicate that
Antananarivo and the region surrounding it (the omitted region dummy) have more late
delivery problems. This possibly reﬂects the fact that the capital city is a major food
deﬁcit area where the urgency of the market is felt more strongly than elsewhere.
Contrary to expectations, econometric results do not suggest that quality problems
are more frequent in the most humid area, the Fianaranatsoa cotes et falaises region. If
anything, quality deﬁciencies are highest in the Vakinankaratra and Antananarivo
regions (the omitted region dummy), two areas of moderate to high rainfall. In terms of
payment by clients, the incidence of breach of contract appears to be signiﬁcantly higher
in the rural areas surrounding the capital city. The reason for these regional differences15 
is unclear.13 One possibility is that they correspond to different equilibria of a ﬂexible
contract enforcement game. This issue deserves more research.
To summarize, we have shown that the incidence of theft and contractual breach is
low but also that Malagasy grain traders go to great length to reduce their exposure to
malfeasance. Regression analysis demonstrated that prevention is effective in the sense
that traders who opt for more risky trading practices face a higher incidence of malfea-
sance. The question now remains of why prevention is the dominant method grain traders
use to reduce risk. To answer this question, we now examine what happens when a theft
or a breach of contract actually occur.
Section 3. Legal Institutions and Deterrence
Recourse to the police is relatively frequent in cases of theft: as shown in Table 11,
one third of theft cases were reported to the police, and respondents went to court --
presumably as witnesses -- in ten percent of the theft cases. Calling upon the police had
no noticeable effect on the probability to recover stolen item, however: of those traders
who went to the police, 24% retrieved all or part of the stolen goods; of those who did
not, 34% retrieved something. The difference is not statistically signiﬁcant (t value of
0.81). The small number of observations (57 cases of theft) precludes further analysis.
We have a little more information on contractual disputes with suppliers and clients.
Surveyed traders were asked whether they ever called upon an intermediary to mediate
their contractual disputes with suppliers or clients, and whether they ever went to the pol-
ice, a lawyer, or a court in relation with a purchase or sales dispute. Their responses,
_ ______________
13 Differences in the function (e.g., collector, wholesaler, retailer, or microretailer) exercised by the
respondent or in the crops they sell, do not, for instance, account for these regional differences.16 
listed in Table 11, show that, apart from an occasional recourse to the police, the use of
legal institutions by Malagasy grain traders is extremely low in contractual disputes with
suppliers and clients.
One conceivable interpretation of these numbers is that legal enforcement in
Madagascar is so effective and predictable that parties rationally anticipate the outcome
and prefer to settle beforehand to avoid litigation costs. Table 11 indeed indicates that
direct negotiations are the instrument of choice to resolve contractual disputes. Mediators
are used occasionally as well. But the data also show that the threat of recourse to the
police or to courts is extremely rare. In addition, these threats tend to be used only in
desperate circumstances. Of the eight cases in which a threat of police action was men-
tioned, for instance, ﬁve were relative to non-payment by a client. Finally, surveyed
traders hardly ever seek the advice of a lawyer. Taken together, these observations sug-
gest that the threat of court action is not an important deterrent of contractual opportun-
ism in the Malagasy grain market. Yet, lack of familiarity with courts and legal institu-
tions does not seem to be the main reason for lack of usage: the fact that one third of
robbed traders went to the police and 11% went to court do not suggest reluctance for
legal institutions per se. What the data therefore indicates is that contractual obligations
are largely seen as outside the purview of the law -- with the possible exception of non-
payment.
This interpretation begs the question of what is the alternative contract enforcement
mechanism: if legal institutions offer little or not protection against opportunistic breach,
why do surveyed traders bother to place orders and grant credit at all? One thing that is
quite clear from interviews is that violence is not seen as a common or even correct way
of resolving contractual disputes. If anything, recourse to courts and police is low17 
because traders perceive these institutions to be too antagonistic and conﬂictual. Refer-
ence to ’trust’ is the most common answer when traders are asked why contracts are
honored. To understand what ’trust’ means to Malagasy traders, we investigate what hap-
pens in dispute cases. The ﬁrst striking ﬁnding is that most contractual disputes are
resolved (85% of supplier cases and 79% of client cases) and trade is resumed in most
cases (91% of supplier cases and 78% of client cases). In addition, dispute resolution and
resumption of trade are highly correlated; 79% of disputes with suppliers and 73% of
disputes with clients are resolved and trade resumed. Similar ﬁndings are reported for
African manufacturers in Fafchamps (1996) and Bigsten et al. (1998).
This suggests that breach of contract, although unwelcome and costly for respon-
dents, occurs within the context of long term relationships. A reasonable interpretation,
largely conﬁrmed by informal discussions with respondents and casual observation, is
that parties implicitly agree to continue trading with each other as long as contractual
breach remains infrequent and provided that, when it occurs, a good faith effort is made
to resolve the situation. If these conditions are satisﬁed, the relationship continues; other-
wise it is severed. In other words, relational contracting as modeled for instance by
Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Fafchamps (1998a) is the key contract enforcement mechan-
ism.
This interpretation is conﬁrmed by regression analysis. Table 12 for instance shows
that more personalized relations and longer acquaintance with suppliers and clients is
associated with efforts to resolve contractual disputes through direct negotiation and, in
the case of clients, through mediators. A contrario, regression results also indicate that
respondents with relatives in agricultural trade are much less likely to negotiate payment
problems with clients. Although a priori surprising, this ﬁnding is consistent with the idea18 
that disciplining relatives is difﬁcult: if so, why bother waste time negotiating with them.
Table 13 and 14 further illustrate that direct negotiations have a strong positive effect on
the probability of resolving the dispute and resuming trade. In other words, good faith
efforts to iron out difﬁculties are essential to the preservation of trust and relationships.
Results again show that payment problems are less likely to be resolved for respondents
who have relatives in agricultural trade -- and who presumably buy and sell from them.
The reader may want to know whether relational contracting as enforcement
mechanism is complemented by information sharing on cheaters and by collusion to
exclude them from future trade, as suggested for instance by Kandori (1992), Greif
(1993), and others. Table 15 provides some useful information in this respect. We see
that, of those traders who obtain supplier credit, less than one ﬁfth come recommended
by other traders. The dominant credit screening procedure is to purchase several times
from the same trader, thereby establishing mutual trust. The most common action taken
in response to non payment is to stop deliveries. Similar ﬁndings are reported by
Fafchamps (1996) for Ghana. Very few respondents expect to involve the police or the
courts in debt collection, hence conﬁrming that the trade relationship constitutes its own
collateral. There is some information sharing about clients who do not pay but its reach is
limited: a majority of respondents estimate that a client who does not pay is unlikely or
very unlikely to lose credit from other suppliers. Exclusion from future trade credit is
thus not the dominant form of contract enforcement, although it plays a secondary role.
These ﬁndings are further conﬁrmed by Table 16. Clients themselves are the main
source of information on which suppliers rely before granting credit. For two third of the
respondents, this is the only source of information on which they rely for screening trade
credit applicants. Only a quarter of the respondents obtain information from other19 
traders; 14% obtain information from other sources. There appears to be no systematic
effort to share information on clients who do not pay: only 13% of credit givers discuss
bad clients with other traders once of month or more; one quarter never discuss bad
clients at all.
Why there is not more information sharing is unclear. One may be tempted to
assume that the ethnic origin of traders is too heterogeneous to allow a ﬂuid exchange of
information (e.g., Cornell and Welch (1996), La Ferrara (1997)). This is not borne out by
the data, however. First, all surveyed traders -- like all inhabitant of Madagascar -- speak
a single common language. Second, traders operate predominantly in their region of ori-
gin: over 85% of traders operate in the district (Fivondronana) of their birth, and the
coefﬁcient of correlation between the postal code of their place of birth and the location
of their trading activity is as high as 0.76. Only 9 traders in the sample are of foreign ori-
gin -- mostly from Asia. Finally, the overwhelming majority of respondents -- 91% --
share a common religion. The idea that linguistic, ethnic, or religious barriers prevent the
circulation of information cannot, therefore, be sustained.
One item of information that is worth pointing out is that riots against traders took
place in the late 1980’s. According to Lonely Planet (1994), "Indo-Pakistani traders []
bore the brunt of Malagasy violence in the 1987 riots. [T]he Indian premises on either
sides [of the main street in Tulear] along with most of the central area were gutted"
(p.220). Blanchy (1995) reports that in ﬁve major cities, Asian owned shops were looted
and burned; many Asians feared for their life and ﬂed the country, if only temporarilly.
Barrett (1997b) reports that Asian traders refused to be interviewed by Malagasy
enumerators and writes that "[it] is difﬁcult to overstate the sensitivity of ethnic Asian
food marketing intermediaries to the political risks of their trade". Judging from20 
Blanchy’s (1995) account of Asian businesses in Madagascar, ethnic Asian business net-
works prior to the riots ressembled their counterparts in Kenya (e.g., Himbara (1994),
Marris (1971), Fafchamps (1998b), Fafchamps et al. (1994)). If, as it is likely, Asian
traders have pulled out of grain markets to reduce their exposure to political risk, the
resulting disruption in existing business networks could explain the current lack of
sophistication of grain trade in the country. Still, this does not explain why indigenous
networks of information sharing have not formed to replace Asian networks them. These
issues deserve more research.
Conclusions
This paper has studied liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how
property rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We
found that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses result-
ing from such instances are small. This, however, does not result from reliance on legal
institutions -- actual recourse to police and courts is fairly rare, except in cases of theft --
but from traders’ reluctance to expose themselves to opportunism. Judging from the evi-
dence collected, the indirect costs of malfeasance prevention are likely to be much
higher than the direct costs of theft and breach of contract. As a result, Malagasy grain
trade resembles a ﬂea market, with little or no forward contracting and high transactions
costs.
We also investigated how contracts are enforced. We found that the dominant con-
tract enforcement mechanism is trust-based relationships. Trust is established primarily
through repeated interaction with little role for referral by other traders. Information on
bad clients does not circulate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non21 
payment. As far as we are able to judge, the lack of information sharing does not result
from the existence of linguistic, ethnic, or religious obstacles to communication. In spite
of great diversity in external appearance, Malagasy society is surprisingly homogeneous.
Rather, the culprit might be sought in the disruption of pre-existing Asian networks that
followed food riots in the late 1980’s. More research is needed to assess why native net-
works did not emerge in their stead and what institutional changes can improve Malagasy
grain markets.22 
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Std. dev. Mean Unit A. Dependent variables
102087 39337 US $ (1) Total annual sales of agricultural food products
21731 5862 US $ (1) Total annual value added
B. Capital and equipment
7635 2061 US $ (1) Working capital
4.7% Yes=1 Dummy if subsidiary
2088 399 US $ (1) Value of equipment
134 26 Metric tons Storage capacity
0.50 0.14 Number Number of vehicles
16.2% Yes=1 Utilization of telephone
C. Labor and management
131.8 39.5 Month/year Manpower (in months/year)
87.3% Yes=1 Dummy if full time trader
83.4% Yes=1 Dummy if trader all year round
3.5 9.1 Years Years of schooling of owner/manager
4.5 6.0 Years Years of experience in agricultural trade
42.8% Yes=1 Commonly speaks a language other than national language
45.7% Female=1 Gender of trader
D. Social capital
1.2 0.7 Number Number of relatives in agric. trade
9.1 8.8 Number Number of traders known
1.7 2.3 Number Number of people who can help
7.6 4.6 Number Number of suppliers known personally
14.2 8.6 Number Number of clients known personally
E. Location
15.7% Yes=1 In capital city
31.3% Yes=1 In another city
19.9% Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
24.9% Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
11.5% Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
12.2% Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
13.4% Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
(1) Computed using an exchange rate of 5000 Francs Malgaches for 1 US$.Table 2. Incidence of Theft and Breach of Contract
Max. Min. Mean 1. Theft
7.70% Traders who experienced theft in last 12 months
93.0% 0.0% 0.28% Value of stolen goods relative to annual sales
2. Late delivery by suppliers
8.81% Traders who experienced late delivery in last 12 months
100.0% 0.0% 1.56% Proportion of late deliveries in total transactions
3. Deficient quality of deliveries by suppliers
20.60% Traders who experienced deficient quality in last 12 months
100.0% 0.0% 4.44% Proportion of deficient quality deliveries in total transactions
4. Late payment by clients
30.80% Traders who experienced late payment in last 12 months
100.0% 0.0% 1.91% Proportion of late payments in total transactions
5. Non-payment by clients
6.82% Traders who experienced non payment in last 12 months
4.2% 0.0% 0.04% Proportion of non payments in total transactions
Note: the exact number of valid observations varies somewhat from question to question
(from 728 to 738).Table 3. Exposure to Theft and Prevention
8% Traders who experienced a theft in last 12 months
Of those who experienced a theft:
42%    % who experienced theft at store during the day
40%    % who experienced theft from storage at night
18%    % who experienced theft during transport/consignment
Of those who experienced a theft:
32%    % who think theft was not due to employee
37%    % who suspect an employee
26%    % who do not know
37% Traders who refrain from hiring workers for fear of theft
72% Traders who leave stocks overnight at sales location
Of those who stock overnight:
99%    % with lock on storage location
64%    % who sleep on premices
52%    % who hire a guard 
95%    % who either sleep on premices or hire a guard
41% Traders who transport goods from one town to another
Of those who transport:
4%    % who avoid certain locations for fear of theft during transport
14%    % who pay someone for protecting goods in transport
30%    % who travel in convoy
43%    % who either pay for protection or travel in convoyTable 4.  Variation of Quality and Inspection by Trader
Traders' assessment of quality variation
1. Whether prices vary with product quality
33% A lot
61% A little bit
7% Not at all
2. Whether product quality varies by region of origin:
37% A lot
57% A little bit
6% Not at all






Average price differential between C1 and C2 quality rice (a):
9% Retail price
8% Wholesale price
Verification of quality before purchase:





2. The person who verifies quality is:
93% Trader himself/herself
4% Family helper
2% Employee or collecting agent
1% Nobody





(a) Source: National Statistical Bureau, computed from dayly price figures fo
Antananarivo, 1997.Table 5. Exposure and Incidence
1. Theft and storage
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader leaves stocks overnight on sales location
0.0578 -1.9016 0.00% 0.38% Value of stolen goods relative to annual sales
198 526 Number of observations
2. Theft and transport
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader transports goods from one location to another
0.9786 -0.0268 0.28% 0.28% Value of stolen goods relative to annual sales
423 307 Number of observations
3. Late delivery by suppliers
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader places orders with suppliers
0.0000 -5.8100 0.00% 10.55% Proportion of transactions with late delivery
620 108 Number of observations
4. Deficient quality of deliveries by suppliers
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader always inspects quality of supplies
0.3660 0.9070 5.76% 4.19% Proportion of transactions with deficient quality
112 616 Number of observations
5. Late payment by clients
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader grants credit to at least some clients
0.0000 -4.3800 0.33% 3.77% Proportion of transactions with late payment
396 336 Number of observations
6. Non-payment by clients
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader grants credit to at least some clients
0.0200 -3.1191 0.00% 0.08% Proportion of transactions with non-payment
396 336 Number of observations
Note: Test of equality of variance rejected in all cases.  All t-tests conducted without assuming equality of variance.  Table 6. Determinants of the Incidence of Theft
The dependent variable is the value of annual losses due to theft divided by total annual sales.  Tobit
estimates reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 2.370 0.297 a 4.356 0.465 Yes=1 Night storage at sales location
p 2.204 0.040 a 1.577 0.020 Log(x+1) Storage capacity
Trader characteristics
p 0.603 0.008 p -0.539 -0.008 p 2.274 0.029 Value Total sales
-1.094 -0.005 -0.439 -0.002 0.108 0.000 Value Years of schooling
-1.585 -0.038 -0.980 -0.023 -0.887 -0.021 Log(x+1) Years of experience
Location dummies
-0.614 -0.044 -1.176 -0.079 -1.136 -0.082 Yes=1 In capital city
-0.600 -0.022 -0.829 -0.030 -0.844 -0.031 Yes=1 In another urban location
-0.693 -0.051 -1.073 -0.074 -1.225 -0.091 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-1.119 -0.081 -1.372 -0.095 -1.473 -0.108 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
0.200 0.016 -0.921 -0.068 -1.291 -0.100 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
1.738 0.233 2.225 0.242 -1.215 -0.102 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
1.455 0.169 1.415 0.122 -1.031 -0.079 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-2.995 -0.541 -2.709 -0.508 -2.912 -0.463 Intercept
0.176 0.169 0.181 Selection-term
672 672 672 Number of observations
92% 92% 92% % zero observations
0.1416 0.2901 0.0619 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.Table 7. Determinants of the Incidence of Late Delivery by Suppliers
The dependent variable is the proportion of late deliveries in total purchase transactions.
Tobit estimates reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 3.551 1.085 a Yes=1 Respondent places orders
Trader characteristics
p -0.178 -0.006 p -1.345 -0.044 p -0.160 -0.005 Value Total sales
0.158 0.002 0.451 0.004 0.868 0.009 Value Years of schooling
-0.664 -0.033 -0.199 -0.009 -0.730 -0.036 Log(x+1) Years of experience
0.976 0.060 0.031 0.002 2.590 0.153 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
-0.156 -0.008 0.401 0.019 1.497 0.071 Log(x+1) # suppliers known personally
Location dummies
0.783 0.135 0.435 0.061 0.147 0.024 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-0.221 -0.020 0.937 0.082 -0.503 -0.044 Yes=1 Other urban location
-0.255 -0.044 -1.498 -0.208 -0.834 -0.137 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-0.665 -0.125 -2.095 -0.311 -1.850 -0.323 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-0.385 -0.077 -1.381 -0.226 -1.612 -0.298 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-0.940 -0.209 -2.043 -0.413 -1.520 -0.330 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
. -2.222 . -1.813 . -2.364 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-1.576 -0.621 1.650 0.604 -1.298 -0.503 Intercept
0.408 0.253 0.415 Selection-term
669 100 669 Number of observations
91% 43% 91% % zero observations
0.237 0.350 0.1908 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = late deveries not observed when no orders are placed.  p = predicted value used as regressor.
See text for details.Table 8. Determinants of the Incidence of Deficient Quality Deliveries by Suppliers
The dependent variable is the proportion of deficient quality deliveries in total purchase transactions. Tobit
estimates reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 0.642 0.024 a 1.207 0.045 Code (c) Verification of quality
Trader characteristics
p 0.159 0.004 p 0.214 0.005 p 0.306 0.007 Value Total sales
-1.170 -0.008 -1.158 -0.008 -1.124 -0.008 Value Years of schooling
-1.804 -0.061 -1.895 -0.064 -1.870 -0.063 Log(x+1) Years of experience
3.624 0.178 4.123 0.167 3.988 0.160 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
1.303 0.043 1.353 0.044 1.190 0.039 Log(x+1) # suppliers known personally
Location dummies
-0.373 -0.044 -0.291 -0.033 -0.243 -0.028 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-0.137 -0.008 -0.247 -0.014 -0.350 -0.020 Yes=1 Other urban location
0.685 0.080 0.841 0.096 0.842 0.097 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-3.035 -0.384 -2.976 -0.370 -2.965 -0.370 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-1.955 -0.253 -1.883 -0.238 -1.857 -0.236 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-2.920 -0.490 -2.983 -0.495 -3.049 -0.507 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
. -2.137 . -2.145 . -2.163 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-0.322 -0.089 -0.769 -0.197 -0.614 -0.157 Intercept
0.353 0.352 0.354 Selection-term
669 669 669 Number of observations
79% 79% 79% % zero observations
0.328 0.330 0.327 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.
Code (c) as follows: 1 = always verifies quality; 2 = often; 3 = sometimes; 4 = rarely; 5 = never.Table 9. Determinants of the Incidence of Late Payment by Clients
The dependent variable is the proportion of late payments in total sales transactions. Tobit estimates
reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 2.491 0.189 a 7.579 0.433 Share Credit sales in total sales
Trader characteristics
p 1.684 0.018 p 0.060 0.001 p 2.519 0.026 Value Total sales
-0.111 -0.000 0.318 0.001 0.138 0.000 Value Years of schooling
0.463 0.008 0.431 0.007 1.401 0.024 Log(x+1) Years of experience
1.556 0.030 1.244 0.024 1.428 0.028 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
0.161 0.002 1.085 0.014 1.254 0.016 Log(x+1) # clients known personally
Location dummies
-2.356 -0.149 -2.402 -0.140 -3.370 -0.201 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-1.761 -0.047 -1.180 -0.031 -2.135 -0.057 Yes=1 Other urban location
-1.051 -0.066 -0.869 -0.050 -1.946 -0.115 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-4.062 -0.249 -4.509 -0.265 -4.621 -0.279 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-3.412 -0.215 -3.711 -0.223 -3.995 -0.247 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-2.955 -0.227 -3.100 -0.217 -4.169 -0.298 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-3.407 -0.255 -3.658 -0.246 -4.842 -0.332 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-1.330 -0.171 -0.699 -0.087 -2.126 -0.263 Intercept
0.192 0.184 0.192 Selection-term
672 672 672 Number of observations
69% 69% 69% % zero observations
0.330 0.485 0.313 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.Table 10. Determinants of the Incidence of Non-Payment by Clients
The dependent variable is the proportion of non-payments in total sales transactions. Tobit estimates
reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p -0.330 -0.003 a 1.762 0.013 Share Credit sales in total sales
Trader characteristics
p 1.916 0.003 p 1.237 0.002 p 1.910 0.002 Value Total sales
1.746 0.001 1.817 0.001 1.723 0.001 Value Years of schooling
0.307 0.001 0.059 0.000 0.203 0.000 Log(x+1) Years of experience
2.203 0.005 2.146 0.005 2.194 0.005 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
-0.963 -0.002 -1.293 -0.002 -1.271 -0.002 Log(x+1) # clients known personally
Location dummies
-1.593 -0.010 -1.237 -0.007 -1.597 -0.009 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-0.802 -0.003 -0.555 -0.002 -0.770 -0.003 Yes=1 Other urban location
-2.368 -0.016 -2.067 -0.013 -2.431 -0.015 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-3.536 -0.024 -3.394 -0.022 -3.588 -0.023 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-3.415 -0.025 -3.279 -0.023 -3.456 -0.024 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-2.745 -0.027 -2.504 -0.023 -2.818 -0.025 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-2.996 -0.027 -2.798 -0.024 -3.151 -0.026 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-2.469 -0.040 -2.162 -0.034 -2.506 -0.038 Intercept
0.015 0.015 0.015 Selection-term
672 672 672 Number of observations
93% 93% 93% % zero observations
-3.442 -3.631 -3.436 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.Table 11. Recourse to Legal Institutions
A. Theft:
37.5% Trader sought help of the police
10.7% Trader went to court
57 Number of observations:
B. Disputes with clients and suppliers:
Traders who ever used the following in a dispute with client or supplier:




729 Number of observations:
Conflict resolution methods used during the last incidence of: 
1. Breach of contract by supplier:
86.0% Trader negotiated directly with supplier
3.4% Trader sought help of mediator
0.0% Trader sought help of lawyer
0.0% Trader threatened to go to the police
0.6% Trader threatened to go to court
178 Number of observations:
2. Breach of contract by client:
93.6% Trader negotiated directly with client
9.1% Trader sought help of mediator
0.5% Trader sought help of lawyer
3.6% Trader threatened to go to the police
0.9% Trader threatened to go to court
220 Number of observations:Table 12.  Determinants of Choice of Dispute Resolution Method
  Dispute with:   Dispute with:
  Client   Supplier
Use of Mediator Direct negotiation   Direct negotiation Dependent variable
Yes=1 Yes=1 Yes=1 Value
z stat Coef. z stat Coef. z stat Coef. Characteristics of transaction:
n.a. n.a. 0.616 0.196 Yes=1 Case of deficient quality
3.273 0.738 1.185 0.072 4.418 0.216 Log(x+1) Length of relationship
-0.968 -0.094 4.974 0.227 1.991 0.055 Log(x+1) Amount paid (supplier)/ due (client)
Characteristic of trader
1.991 0.231 1.057 0.132 -0.961 -0.118 Log(x) Total sales
-1.927 -0.505 -3.457 -0.792 -1.058 -0.234 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
0.531 0.104 1.846 0.383 1.729 0.332 Log(x+1) # suppliers/clients known personally
-3.849 -7.512 -2.147 -3.163 0.666 0.918 Intercept
246 246 180 Number of observations
0.215 0.522 0.229 Pseudo R-squareTable 13. Determinants of Conflict Resolution with Suppliers
Probit estimates reported.
Trade is resumed (Yes=1) Dispute is resolved (Yes=1)
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Method of dispute resolution
1.887 0.793 4.585 2.805 Yes=1 Direct negotiations with supplier
Characteristics of transaction
0.706 0.232 0.596 0.191 -1.335 -0.538 -1.912 -0.711 Yes=1 Dispute is about quality
-0.962 -0.053 -0.414 -0.021 -0.185 -0.011 0.751 0.036 Log(x+1) Days of trade with supplier
-1.022 -0.027 -0.933 -0.025 -1.363 -0.040 -1.454 -0.037 Log(x+1) Amount already paid to supplier
Characteristics of trader
1.982 0.304 1.798 0.259 2.747 0.458 2.177 0.299 Value Total annual sales
0.328 0.076 0.230 0.054 -1.311 -0.326 -1.623 -0.333 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
0.286 0.060 0.639 0.129 0.663 0.175 1.680 0.364 Log(x+1) # suppliers known personally
-1.523 -2.645 -1.068 -1.696 -2.861 -5.879 -1.278 -2.012 Intercept
171 171 167 167 Number of observations
0.081 0.049 0.412 0.177 Pseudo R-square
Note: Results give the outcome of a contractual dispute conditional on a dispute having occurred.Table 14. Determinants of Conflict Resolution with Clients
Probit estimates reported.
Trade is resumed (Yes=1) Dispute is resolved (Yes=1)
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Method of dispute resolution
3.743 1.680 3.851 2.375 Direct negotiations with supplier
-2.650 -0.925 -2.943 -1.042 Recourse to third-party mediator
-2.805 -2.014 -0.968 -0.536 Recourse to lawyer
Characteristics of transaction
-1.227 -0.065 -1.366 -0.064 -0.299 -0.016 -0.586 -0.028 Log(x+1) Days of trade with client
-2.864 -0.136 -1.381 -0.056 0.758 0.052 0.783 0.048 Log(x+1) Value of the sales transaction
Characteristics of trader
0.913 0.079 0.413 0.033 0.313 0.031 0.457 0.040 Value Total annual sales
-2.604 -0.501 -2.937 -0.481 -2.696 -0.571 -3.555 -0.614 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
2.810 0.491 2.617 0.397 3.781 0.713 3.697 0.603 Log(x+1) # clients known personally
-0.393 -0.402 0.792 0.746 -2.589 -3.288 -0.923 -0.975 Intercept
231 235 222 223 Number of observations
0.244 0.077 0.286 0.122 Pseudo R-square
Note: Results give the outcome of a contractual dispute conditional on a dispute having occurred.Table 15. Trade Credit
With With
Clients Suppliers A. Procedure to obtain/grant supplier credit
72.4% 83.0% Purchase several times
9 7     in which case, how many times
17.1% 11.3% Be referred by another trader
2.4% 1.5% Provide a bank guarantee or give a deposit
1.8% 0.5% Fill in forms
Client Supplier B. Action taken in case of non payment
88.9% 77.7% Stop deliveries
4.4% 1.6% Go to the police
1.8% 0.5% Go to court
Client Supplier C. Loss of credit with other suppliers
20.9% 11.3% Very unlikely
58.7% 40.2% Unlikely
15.4% 31.4% Likely
4.9% 17.0% Very likely
342 195 Number of observations
Note: Data collected only from respondents who receive or give supplier credTable 16. Screening of Potential Trade Credit Recipients
A. Source of information on client
95.9% Obtain information from client himself/herself
24.0% Obtain information from other traders
12.3% Obtain information from other sources
1.2% Obtain information from client's bank
B. Information sharing with other traders about bad clients
1.5% Once a day
1.7% Once a week
10.1% Once a month
62.6% Occasionally
24.1% Never
344 Number of observations:
Note: Data collected only from respondents who give credit to clients.Appendix A. Instrumenting Regression for Total Sales
t stat. Coef. A. Capital and equipment
6.720 0.209 Log(x) Working capital
5.018 1.072 Yes=1 Dummy if subsidiary
1.656 0.042 Log(x+1) Value of equipment
3.932 0.174 Log(x+1) Storage capacity
-0.955 -0.210 Log(x+1) Number of vehicles
2.613 0.368 Yes=1 Utilization of telephone
B. Labor and management
1.880 0.010 Value Age of trader
-1.269 -0.115 Male=1 Sexe of trader
5.394 0.515 Log(x) Manpower (in months/year)
-1.412 -0.255 share % family labor in total labor force
0.909 0.138 Yes=1 Dummy if full time trader
2.833 0.394 Yes=1 Dummy if trader all year round
1.614 0.026 Level Years of schooling of owner/manager
0.268 0.020 Log(x+1) Years of experience in agricultural trade
-1.373 -0.156 Yes=1 Speaks another language
C. Social capital
-2.186 -0.225 Log(x+1) Number of relatives in agric. trade
1.994 0.137 Log(x+1) Number of traders known
3.541 0.307 Log(x+1) Number of people who can help
0.852 0.053 Log(x+1) Number of suppliers known personally
1.695 0.104 Log(x+1) Number of clients known personally
D. Entrepreneur's wealth
-0.683 -0.000 Log(x+1) Value of home
E. Entrepreneur's attitude
-2.448 -0.145 Index Propensity to invest in business
-2.665 -0.103 Index Propensity to save
-0.593 -0.023 Index Propensity to spend on durables
-1.048 -0.063 Index Individualism
-0.305 -0.016 Index Altruism
F. Entrepreneur's family background
-0.362 -0.045 Yes=1 Father has primary education
0.567 0.071 Yes=1 Mother has primary education
1.314 0.196 Yes=1 Father has secondary education
0.305 0.056 Yes=1 Mother has secondary education
1.183 0.110 Log(x+1) Father's years of trade experience
-1.272 -0.124 Log(x+1) Mother's years of trade experience
-0.411 -0.050 Log(x+1) Father's years of ag. trade exper.
0.024 0.003 Log(x+1) Mother's years of ag. trade exper.
0.197 0.006 Log(x+1) Number of adult brothers 
2.608 0.081 Log(x+1) Number of adult sisters
F. Shocks
1.985 0.161 Ratio Aggregate sales shock
G. Location
-1.591 -0.566 Yes=1 In capital city
2.240 0.272 Yes=1 In another city
-1.384 -0.457 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-3.100 -1.140 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-2.786 -1.043 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-0.979 -0.388 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-2.404 -0.939 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
10.465 6.552 Intercept
672 Number of observations
0.620 R-squaredAppendix B:  Determinants of Exposure to Risk
Share of Quality Placement of Overnight Storage
credit purchases verification orders storage capacity
Share Rank from 1 to 4 Yes=1 Yes=1 Log(x+1) Dependent variable:
2-limit tobit Ordered probit Probit Probit Tobit Estimator:
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. A. Wealth
2.364 0.000 -0.731 -0.000 -1.031 -0.000 2.427 0.000 8.055 0.000 Value Value of home
B. Human capital
0.370 0.001 0.512 0.004 2.075 0.017 1.515 0.019 5.292 0.033 Value Age of trader
-1.392 -0.033 1.218 0.169 -0.298 -0.041 -0.328 -0.068 -1.777 -0.190 Male=1 Sexe of trader
1.672 0.007 0.538 0.014 1.236 0.027 1.363 0.049 2.254 0.038 Value Years of schooling
2.940 0.062 -0.726 -0.098 0.059 0.007 0.384 0.071 0.478 0.043 Log(x+1) Years of trade experience
C. Social network capital
-1.267 -0.034 -4.218 -0.722 1.058 0.154 0.419 0.115 0.306 0.038 Log(x+1) # relatives in ag. trade
2.135 0.039 -1.093 -0.122 -2.274 -0.229 -0.546 -0.093 -0.849 -0.069 Log(x+1) # traders known
1.088 0.025 1.729 0.254 -0.085 -0.011 2.127 0.432 0.576 0.060 Log(x+1) # people who can help
-1.929 -0.030 -1.664 -0.157 3.409 0.329 0.096 0.013 2.473 0.180 Log(x+1) # suppliers known pers.
4.860 0.082 1.778 0.180 0.327 0.030 1.285 0.188 1.019 0.074 Log(x+1) # clients known pers.
D. Personal traits
-3.117 -0.051 -1.939 -0.224 -0.829 -0.076 1.598 0.206 2.640 0.182 Index Propensity to invest in business
-5.383 -0.053 -3.261 -0.204 1.021 0.056 -1.420 -0.127 -0.219 -0.010 Index Propensity to save
-1.710 -0.017 -1.933 -0.114 -0.783 -0.043 -0.422 -0.038 -1.353 -0.062 Index Propensity to spend on durables
0.841 0.013 -1.648 -0.169 1.403 0.118 -1.068 -0.150 0.699 0.050 Index Individualism
-1.234 -0.017 0.144 0.012 -3.288 -0.261 2.743 0.373 -0.646 -0.040 Index Altruism
E. Family background
0.602 0.020 0.362 0.078 1.571 0.301 0.500 0.155 0.614 0.091 Yes=1 Father has primary education
-0.312 -0.011 0.707 0.146 -1.726 -0.326 -1.849 -0.590 -1.254 -0.189 Yes=1 Mother has primary education
-0.250 -0.010 0.001 0.000 2.446 0.556 0.132 0.046 1.992 0.358 Yes=1 Father has high school educ.
0.422 0.021 1.256 0.369 -1.507 -0.422 -0.344 -0.144 1.043 0.230 Yes=1 Mother has high school educ.
-0.286 -0.007 -1.380 -0.189 -0.356 -0.046 2.439 0.461 0.013 0.002 Log(x+1) Father's years of trade experience
0.639 0.015 2.552 0.341 1.280 0.164 -1.688 -0.283 0.212 0.026 Log(x+1) Mother's years of trade experience
0.954 0.028 1.085 0.184 0.628 0.101 -3.062 -0.751 -0.467 -0.070 Log(x+1) Father's years of ag. trade exper.
-0.883 -0.026 -2.251 -0.373 -1.117 -0.175 2.523 0.584 0.775 0.114 Log(x+1) Mother's years of ag. trade exper.
2.172 0.017 1.467 0.075 -0.232 -0.011 1.732 0.125 -2.125 -0.076 Value Number of adult brothers
3.613 0.030 -0.805 -0.042 -1.187 -0.055 -1.215 -0.087 -0.200 -0.008 Value Number of adult sisters
F. Location
-3.528 -0.300 -0.152 -0.097 0.443 0.213 -5.033 -4.614 0.914 0.379 Yes=1 In capital city
-1.162 -0.036 -1.943 -0.357 -0.055 -0.010 1.022 0.325 -0.986 -0.139 Yes=1 In another urban location
-3.916 -0.313 0.433 0.265 0.322 0.143 -4.713 -4.626 0.804 0.315 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-2.389 -0.210 0.088 0.058 -0.048 -0.024 -5.117 -5.065 0.913 0.389 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-2.574 -0.227 0.304 0.198 -0.344 -0.174 -6.079 -6.029 -0.979 -0.420 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-4.165 -0.416 -1.249 -0.955 0.727 0.400 -8.942 -9.513 -2.282 -1.044 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-4.943 -0.460 -1.933 -1.413 -0.212 -0.113 -9.031 -8.976 -0.555 -0.240 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
1.037 0.136 -0.363 -2.247 -1.675 . 4.546 -0.687 -0.420 Intercept
0.849 Second intercept (ordered probit only)
1.330 Third intercept (ordered probit only)
0.250 1.289 Selection-term (tobit only)
704 700 703 704 696 Number of observations
0.4607 0.2419 0.1471 0.7391 0.1224 Pseudo R-square